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Guidance

The 2023 money laundering and terrorist financing risks within the British gambling industry

The Gambling Commission's money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment for the British gambling industry in 2023.

  1. Contents
  2. 11 - Bingo (remote)

11 - Bingo (remote)

Table actions:

Sector rating

Sector Previous overall risk rating Current overall risk rating
Bingo (Remote) High High

The remote bingo and betting sector will be assessed separately for the purposes of this assessment as the risks differ for both sectors.

For further information relating to the inherent risks (including vulnerabilities, consequences and controls), see our previous 2020 risk assessment.

Sector rating

Vulnerability Risk Likelihood of event occurring Impact of event occurring Overall risk Change in risk
Operator Control Operators failing to comply with prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing legislation and guidance High (3) High (3) High (9) No change
Operator control Operators staking and winning directly and indirectly on their own products Low (1) Medium (2) Low (2) No change
Operator control Poor source of funds checks High (3) High (3) High (9) No change
Operator control Inadequate or lack of 'know your customer' (KYC) checks High (3) High (3) High (9) No change
Operator control Third party business relationships and business investors Medium (2) High (3) High (6) New risk rating
Licensing and integrity Gambling operations run by organised criminals to launder criminally derived funds Low (1) High (3) Medium (3) No change
Customer Customer not physically present for identification High (3) High (3) High (9) No change
Customer False or stolen documentation used to bypass controls to launder criminally derived funds Medium (2) High (3) High (6) No change
Customer Accessibility to multiple remote accounts Medium (2) High (3) High (6) Decrease in likelihood
Customer Customers on the sanction list Low (1) High (3) Medium (3) New risk rating
Customer Use of third parties or agents to obscure the source or ownership of money gambled by customers and their identities Medium (2) High (3) High (6) New risk rating
Customer ‘Smurfing’ Medium (2) High (3) High (6) New risk rating
Means of payment Cryptoasset transactions Medium (2) High (3) High (6) New risk rating
Means of payment Pre-paid cards Medium (2) High (3) High (6) Decrease in likelihood
Means of payment Multiple methods of payment Medium (2) High (3) High (6) New risk
Means of payment E-wallets Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (4) No change

Case studies

False or stolen ID
A criminal used stolen ID and debit cards with a gambling operator. The individual deposited funds from several stolen debit cards into the gambling account and then attempted to withdraw the funds to one debit card.

Multiple methods of payment
An individual made deposits into their gambling account from several different debit cards as well as an e-wallet. When withdrawing funds, they only used the e-wallet. A customer made multiple deposits using numerous debit cards within the first hour of opening their account.

Accessibility to multiple accounts
Following Know Your Customer (KYC) checks an individual was identified as having deposits and credits with several dozen online gambling operators and payment processors during only a few months.

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2023 money laundering and risks - Betting (non-remote)
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2023 money laundering and risks - Bingo (non-remote)
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