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Report

Open banking data modelling of gambling spend thresholds

This report sets out the results of an analysis of a sample of open banking data for the modelling of gambling spend thresholds

  1. Contents
  2. Discussion

Discussion

When considering the 2 proposed risk assessment thresholds for single operator net spend, we see that similar numbers of individuals exceed each, with 93 and 95 unique individuals for the £1000 and £2000 thresholds respectively. There is a large overlap in the sets of unique individuals identified by each. However, for each of these thresholds between a fifth and a quarter of individuals identified did not exceed the other threshold. This results in a notably higher number of unique individuals exceeding at least one risk assessment threshold, 120, than either threshold alone.

For the 2 proposed vulnerability check thresholds for single operator net spend, we see that a far greater number of individuals exceed the £125 threshold than the £500 threshold, with 539 and 372 unique individuals identified respectively. We note that almost every unique individual exceeding the £500 threshold also exceeds the £125 threshold, with only 1 percent of individuals captured by £500 threshold not also exceeding the £125 threshold.

When considering the differences between evaluating the thresholds separately for each operator to evaluating across all gambling transactions identified in the data, we see relatively small differences in the number of individuals captured by the 2 vulnerability check thresholds and only a 3 percent increase in the numbers exceeding at least one of these. However, the equivalent increase for the risk assessment thresholds is larger, with 13 percent more individuals exceeding at least one of the risk assessment thresholds across all gambling spend than when measuring spend separately for each operator. This difference is less extreme for the £1000 threshold than for the £2000 threshold, with 5 percent more individuals captured by the £1000 threshold when considering all gambling spend compared to 20 percent for the £2000 threshold.

In a follow-up analysis exercise, the 30-day threshold was adjusted from £125 to £150. This resulted in only a minor change to the number of individuals that would meet each threshold (as defined in this exercise). For the single operator net spend with the increased £150 threshold value, 171 individuals would have met only the £150 in 30-days threshold, 8 individuals would have met only the £500 in 365-days threshold and 336 would have met both thresholds (as defined in this exercise). This equates to 1.6 percent of individuals meeting either or both thresholds doing so only through the 365-day limit. These calculations were produced using a slightly updated dataset after a relatively small number of additional gambling transactions (comprising approximately 0.4 percent of the total transactions) had been identified following the initial analysis.

Author:
Steven Murphy
Postdoctoral Data Scientist, Gambling Commission
Honorary research fellow, Warwick Business School

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Results - Open banking data modelling of gambling spend thresholds
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